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Stubbs v. Lee, supra [64 Me. 195 (18 Am. Rep. 251).]
Thence [sic.] it is that two such offices must be held to be
incompatible. "
[6] The two offices in question being incompatible, it follows that when the respondent accepted the office of city
attorney, said acceptance had the effect of vacating or terminating his right to hold the office of city judge. As was
said in Peoplev. Garrett, supra: "The rule is settled with
unanimity that where an individual is an incumbent of a
public office and, during such incumbency, is appointed or
elected to another public office and enters upon the duties of
the latter, the first office becomes at once vacant if the two
are incompatible (Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 419; 22
R. C. L., sec. 63) . . . "
McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, second edition, volume 2, section 469, thus states the rule: "The common law
rule is that the acceptance by a public officer of another office
which is incompatible with the first thereby vacates the first
office; that is, the mere acceptance of the second incompatible
office per se terminates the first office as effectively as a
resignation. "
[7] It appearing from what we have said in the foregoing opinion that respondent was at the time of the commencement of this action unlawfully holding the office of city
judge of the city of San Bruno, the present proceeding in
quo warranto was the proper method of challenging his right
thereto, and the complaint on behalf of appellant alleged
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, and defendant's demurrer thereto should have been overruled.
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
to overrule the demurrer and proceed with the disposition
of the cause in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Gibson, C. J., concurred.
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[1] JUDGMENTS-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULT!rDISCRETION OF COURT--DISCRETION AS TO OPENING DEFAULTs.-The
right to set aside a default judgment within six months after
entry for inadvertence, mistake, and excusable neglect under Code
Civ. Pro c., sec. 473, rests largely within the discretion of the
trial court, the exorcise of which will not be disturbed on appeal
in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion.
[2] ID.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-GROUNDS
FOR RELIEF-EXCUSABLE NEGLECT AND INADVERTENCE-APPLICATION
OF RULE-NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIEs.-The exercise of a trial
court's discretion in setting aside a default judgment under Code
Civ. Proc., sec. 473, will not be disturbed on appeal where it was
based on a showing of continued negotiations between the parties
for a settlement of their e1aims out of court, which 'lulled the attorney into a sense of security by reason of which he failed to
file an answer.
[3] ID.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-GROUNDS
FOR RELIEF-IGNORANCE-IGNORANCE OF LAw.-Ignorance of the
law on the part of an attorney is not ordinarily a sufficient· ground
for setting aside a default judgment under Code Civ. Proc., see.
473.
[4] ID.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGME.t<TS AND DEFAULTS-GROUNDB
FOR RELIEF-IN GENERAIr-STATEMENTS 'OF CoUNSEL AS AFFECTING
GROUNDS URGEABLE.-The fact that plaintiff's attorney, when a default judgment on a cross· complaint was set up in defense of the
original cause, erroneously stated that no answer could be filed
to a complaint for declaratory relief, does not bar him from moving
to set aside the judgment on other grounds.
[5] ID.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-PROCEDURE
TO OBTAIN RELIEF-AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER SHOWING OF MERITSNECESSITY FOR.-Before a trial court can be called upon to exercise
2. Relief from def~ult judgment due to mistake or oversight of
counsel generally, note, 126 A. L. R. 367. See, also, 14 Oal. Jur. 1072.
5. Necessity of showing meritorious defense, notes, .34 A. L. B.
215; 118 A. L. R. 1464; 122 A. L. R. 621. See, also,14 Oal. Jur~ 1052;
31 Am. Jur. 311; 15 R. O. L. 71.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Judgments, § 157; 2. Judgments, § 177
(1); 3. Judgments, § 178; 4. Judgments, § 163; 5,6. Judgments, § 209;
7. Judgments, § 210 (2); 8. Pleading, § 220; 9. Judgments, § 211•
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its discretion under Code Civ. Proc., sec. 473, in relieving from a
default judgment, the party ill default must show not only a good
excuse for his default, but also that he has a meritorious defense
to the action.
rD.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-PROCEDURE
TO OBTAIN RELIEF-AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER SHOWING OF MERITS-How
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE SHOwN.-The showing of a meritorious defense ·by a party moving to set aside a default judgment under
Code Civ. Pro c., sec. 473, is usually made either by additional affidavit or by a copy of the· proposed verified pleading required to ac. company the· application.
rD.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-PROCEDURE
TO OBTAIN RELIEF-REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY OF AFFIDAVIT m'
MERITS-STATEMENT' TO AND ADVICE OF COUNSEL.-An affidavit of
meritorious defense used on a motion under Code Civ. Proc., sec.
473, must state the client's belief in the merits of his case, and
must show that he has fully and fairly stated the facts of the case
to his attorney, whereupon counsel's advice amounts to a prima facie
showing of merit. An affidavit which merely avers that the party
"had a good defense" is insufficient.
PLEADING---SIGNATURE AND VERIFICATION-WHO MAY VERIFy-AT'
TORNEY.-An attorney may properly verify a proposed answer where
the party is out of the state. (Oode Civ. Proc., sec. 446.)
JUDGMENTS-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTSPROOEDURE TO OBTAIN RELIEF-PLEADINGS SHOWING MERITS.-There
is a sufficient showing of a meritorious defense for a motion under
Code Civ. Proc., sec. 473, where a copy of the proposed answer
accompanying the application denies a material allegation of the
cross-complaint and is properly verified by the attorney as being
true of his own knowledge.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granting a motion to set aside a default judgment. Robert W. Kenny, Judge. Order affirmed.
Euler & Subith, Louis J. Euler and Lois R. Mead for Appellant.
Luther F. Opelt for Respondent.
6. Sufficiency of affidavit of merits on motion to set aside, note,
124 A. L. R. 149. See, also, 14 Oal. Jur. 1051 et seq; 31 Am. Jur.
312; 15 R. C. L. 718.
8. Verification of pleading by attorney of party, note, 7 A. L. R. 5.
See, also, 21 CaL Jur. 218; 21 R. C. L. 491.
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TRAYNOR, J.-Respondent brought suit against appellant
in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County on a judgment
for payment of alimony secured in the Oircuit Court of the
State of Oregon. Appellant filed a cross-complaint allegi~g
that the original alimony decree had been entered pursuant to
a stipulation between the parties calling for payments for a
period of only two years and that such payments had been
made, and asking for a determination of his rights and duties
under the stipUlation and original judgment. The cross-complaint was duly served on respondent's attorney but respondent failed to file an answer. The court entered a default
judgment declaring that appellant was" entitled to a satisfaction of said [prior] judgment and a release from further
liabilit.y thereunder." When respondent's original cause came
on for trial the appellant set up the judgment on the crosscomplaint in defense and was sustained by the court. At this
time the attorney for the respondent stated as his reason for
failing to answer the cross-complaint: "You cannot file an
answer to a complaint for declaratory relief", whereupon he
was informed of his error by the court. Respondent then filed
a motion to set aside the default judgment because of inadvertence, mistake and excusable neglect under Oode of Oivil
Procedure, section 473, alleging that continued negotiations
between respondent and appellant for a settlement of their
claims out of court had lulled the attorney for the respondent
into a sense of security by reason of which he failed to file
an answer to the cross-complaint. Accompanying the motion
was an affidavit by the respondent's attorney to the effect that
the respondent had a good defense to the cross-complaint and
appended thereto was a proposed answer to the cross-complaint verified by the respondent's attorney. The court
granted the motion to set aside the default judgment. The
appellant has appealed from the order granting this motion.
[1] The right to set aside a default judgment within six
months of entry for inadvertence, mistake, and excusable
neglect under Oode of Civil Procedure, section 473, is a
matter largely within the discretion of the trial court and will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing
that this discretion has been abused. (County of Los Angeles
v. Lewis, 179 Oal. 398 [177 Pac. 154]; Waite v. Southern Pac.
Co., 192 Oal. 467 [221 Pac. 204] ; Brooks v. Nelson, 95 Cal.
App. 144 [272 Pac. 610] ; Week v. Sucher, 96 Cal. App. 422
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[274 Pac. 579].) [2] In the present case the trial court
found that there was a sufficiently reasonable excuse to justify
the setting aside of the default judgment, apparently on the
basis of respondent's allegation that the continued negotiatibns between the respondent and appellant had lulled the
respondent's attorney into a sense of security. This exercise
of discretion presents no appareni abuse to justify interference by this court. [3] While it is true, as appellant contends, that ignorance of the law on the part of an attorney
is not ordinarily sufficient grounds for setting aside a default
judgment under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Shearman v. Jorgensen, 106 Cal. 483 [39 Pac. 863] ; Kammerer v. Marino, 66 Cal. App. 720 [226 Pac. 980] ; Alferitz
v. Oahen, 145 Cal. 397 [78 Pac. 878]), [4] the mere fact
that respondent's attorney erroneously stated in comt that
no answer could be filed to a complaint for declaratory relief
does not bar respondent from asserting other grounds for
setting aside the default which the court might find sufficient.
[5] Before the trial court can be called upon to exercise
its discretion in relieving from a default judgment, however,
the party in default must show not only a good excuse for his
default, but also, that he, has a meritorious defense to the
action. (Brooks v. Nelson, supra; Nickerson v. CaliforniaJ!
Raisin Co., 61 Cal. 268; Greenamyer v. Board of Lugo E. S.
DiStrict, 116 Cal. App. 319 [2 Pac. (2d) 848]; Doyle v. Rice
Ranch O~7, Co., 28 Cal. App. (2d) 18 [81 Pac. (2d) 980];
Morganv. McDonald, 70 Cal. 32 [11 Pac. 350].) [6] The
showing of meritorious defense is usually made either by
additional affidavit or by a copy of the proposed verified
pleading which is required by section 473 to accompany the
application. [7] If an affidavit of meritorious defense is
presented, it must state the elient's belief in the merits of his
case, and it must show that he has fully and' fairly stated the
facts of the case to his attorney, in which situation the advice
of counsel amounts to a prima facie showing of merit. (Janson v. Bryant, 52 Cal. App. 505 [199 Pac. 542] ; Nickerson v.
California Raisin Co., supra; Greenamyer v. Board of Lugo
E. S. District, supra; Ross v. San Diego Glazed C. P. Co., 50
Cal. App. 170 [194 Pac. 1059] ; Pingree v. Reynolds, 23 Cal.
App. (2d) 649 [73 Pac. (2d) 1266] ; Andrews v. Jacoby, 39
Cal. App. 382 [178 Pac. 969] ; Gm v. Peppin, 41 Cal. App.
487 [182 Pac. 815].) In the present case, the affidavit filed
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by the attorney for respondent is defective in that it fails
to show respondent had fully and fairly stated all the facts
of the case to her attorney, the only averment in this regard
being "That plaintiff had a good defense to said cross-complaint. " (Ibid.) There was appended to the affidavit, however, [8] a proposed answer by respondent to the cross-complaint properly verified by her attorney as respondent was
out of the state. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 446.) [9] I~ his
verification respondent's attorney stated "that he 'has read
the foregoing answer and knows 'the contents thereof, and
that the same is true of his own knowledge." The filing of
such a proposed answer is clearly a proper method of showing
a meritorious defense (Salsberry v. Julian, 98 Cal. App. 638,
639 [277 Pac. 516]; Savage v. Smith, 170 Cal. 472 [150 Pac.
353] ; Sampanes v. Chazes, 54 Cal. App. 612 [202 Pac. 462] ;
Park v. Hillman, 67 Cal. App. 92 [224 Pac. 100]), and since
the attorney in his verification stated that the contents were
true to his knowledge" all necessary requirements were met.
The proposed answer denied the allegation in the cross-complaint that appellant had fully performed all the terms and
conditions of the alimony judgment and was entitled to a
release from further liability, thereby clearly raising an issue
of' fact and law which the court was justified in holding a
meritorious defense.
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
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Shenk, J., Houser, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and
Gibson, C. J., concurred. Carter, J., concurred in the conclusion reached.
Rehearing denied.
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